Almost five weeks have passed since the US and Israel attacked Iran on Feb. 28. Iran has retaliated with missile and drone barrages and a de facto blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. The price of oil has nearly doubled, and financial markets have fallen sharply.
The US continues to send military resources, including elite ground troops, to the region, which exacerbates the uncertainty. US President Donald Trump, meanwhile, has made conflicting statements about his goals for the war and his timeline for ending it. The war remains unpopular in the US and everywhere else.
At various stages of the war, Trump has asked US allies, including South Korea, to contribute to the war effort, but no country has stepped forward. It remains, as it has from the start, a US and Israeli effort. As the war has dragged on, NATO allies have become bolder in criticizing the war and rejecting US requests to grant the air force overflight rights. Trump has responded angrily to the rejections, which has raised further concerns about the future of the NATO alliance.
Why have US allies, particularly key members of NATO, such as the UK, been so united in rejecting Trump’s pressure? And what does it mean for the future of NATO and other US alliances?
All of the leaders of US allies are politicians elected in free and fair elections; they know what public opinion is. A March 31 Reuters/Ipsos poll in the US showed that 35 percent of respondents supported the war, while 60 percent opposed it and 66 percent wanted US involvement to end quickly. The New York Times aggregate of polls on March 31 gave Trump a 39 percent approval rating, the lowest of his second term, and a disapproval rating of 56 percent. Polls across Europe reveal immense disapproval of war and of Trump. In the UK, for example, a March 9 YouGov poll showed that 59 percent of respondents opposed the war while only 25 percent supported it. Poll numbers like these would make any politician think twice about supporting a war that Trump initiated unilaterally.
Donald Trump is now more than a year into his second term, and most leaders have met him and worked with him during that time or, in a few cases, during his first term. Trump is not new, and they have a better understanding of how he makes decisions and what that means for their countries.
They have most likely concluded that a reciprocal and cooperative relationship with Trump is not possible. In such a relationship, contributing to the US war effort would deepen the relationship with the US in a way that benefits their national interest. Because Trump is always changing his mind and moving the goal posts, they have little faith their cooperation will be acknowledged and rewarded. Trump has sensed this, which explains the reports that he is considering ending the war even if the Strait of Hormuz remains blocked, leaving it for others to deal with.
In the main, then, most leaders of US allies now view Trump as a diminished force politically, but as someone they must endure and deal with until January 2029. They have concluded that he does not understand how alliances work to the benefit of all parties involved. The question they are wrestling with now is what comes after Trump.
If Trump’s approval rating remains low, a Democratic candidate has a strong chance of winning the 2028 election. None of the possible candidates is an old-fashioned Atlanticist like Joe Biden; none of them is hostile to alliances as Trump is. Instead, the dominant ethos running through the crop of Gen X and older millennial candidates is a mix of wariness of intervention and support for alliances and collective security.
The question then is what will happen to the Republicans after Trump. The party will experience the same generational change as the Democrats, which suggests a similar wariness of intervention. Trump has made support for alliances taboo, but that could change after he leaves the stage. Alliances could gain support as candidates view them as a way to magnify US power instead of as a constraint and financial burden.
For South Korea, all this means that the alliance will most likely emerge from Trump’s second term intact. Chances are high that future presidents will value it more than Trump. The Gen X and millennial wariness of intervention in both parties, meanwhile, could lead toward greater support for reducing tensions with North Korea. Guarded optimism is in order.